Monday, July 27, 2015

Book Review: Westad's The Global Cold War





                Ideology can play a huge role in historical narrative, but rarely does ideology become the theory upon which the history is grounded.  World renowned historian of the Cold War and the 20th century, Odd Arne Westad, tackled ideology as the linchpin of Cold War agency and causality with his book The Global Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  The tradition of world history got a unique experience with Westad’s work; a narrative where ideology—not nationalism, not military strategy, not economic conditions—took center stage as the catalyst for activity by the two dominant superpowers from 1945-1991.  Westad achieved this perspective by widening the lens of Cold War history, which he believed was and is “still generally assumed to have been a contest between two superpowers over military power and strategic control, mostly centered on Europe.”[i]  By a widened lens, I mean the investigation of aspects of the Cold War that “were neither military nor strategic, nor Europe-centered, but connected to political and social development in the Third World.”[ii]  It is only by this shift—from the First and Second worlds to the Third—that we are able to see the importance of ideology with regard to world history in the post-WWII contemporary period.
                The Cold War is commonly seen as a unique, or new type of conflict.  Cold in the sense that it is not a hot war like World War II; War in the sense that there existed an obvious conflict between dominant groups.  Ideology was never ignored, it should be known, by previous historians and scholars of the Cold War—but it never took primary agency.  With ideology as the cause and rational explanation for agency among counterpoised groups (Communist and non-Communist regimes), Westad suggested that the Cold War was, in fact, a much more common story.  In his own words:
“In a historical sense—and especially as seen from the South—the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means.  As a process of conflict, it centered on control and domination, primarily in ideological terms.  The methods of the superpowers and of their local allies were remarkably similar to those honed during the last phase of European colonialism: giant social and economic projects, bringing promises of modernity to their supporters and mostly death to their opponents or those who happened to get in the way of progress.”[iii]
By South, Westad referred to the Southern Hemisphere of the world, which for the most part remained relegated to the Third World throughout the 20th century.  The South, Westad contended, was historically left out of Cold War histories because of previous scholars’ contention that the Cold War as a narrative “conceptually and analytically does not belong in the South”—a contention that Westad finds false for two primary reasons.
                The first reason for the relocation of agency in the Cold War rested on Westad’s observation of “interventionism” by Soviet and US governments and the profound influences these actions had on the social development of Third World cultures and people.  Interventions by both superpowers “shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which political, social, and cultural changes in the Third World took place.”  However, Westad rests his logic on the counterfactual presumption that “Africa, Asia, and possibly Latin America would have been very different regions today” had it not been for the interventionism of the Cold War.[iv]  The second reason for the agency shift is a much more palatable one:  That ruling elites in the Third World used the United States and the Soviet Union as models upon which to judge, rationalize, and implement “high modernity.”
                This second contention shares many philosophical tints as my own perspective on the Cold War, which is a vying of control by two similar but ideologically divided forms of the modern Republic (something I call the State-Form thesis).  The “state-forms” generated in the consciousness of citizens and foreign cultures existed as abstract models by which the rest of the world was expected to conform.  The dialectical struggle between West and East would result in a victory of one state-form over the other.  The battleground for this struggle, however, was the Third World.  The cultivation of high modernism by Third World nations was their means for legitimizing rule and take the supposedly correct steps toward international development and integration into the world economic order.  David Harvey explained this concept of high modernism, and was also quoted by Westad in his conclusion:
“High modernism is the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideals and social orders under standardized conditions of knowledge and production.”[v]
Rather than see the Cold War period as a unique segment of world history however (which my State-Form thesis does seek to do), Westad saw the Cold War as a component of the longue durée history that we more commonly understand as European hegemony and domination.
                Westad’s text, which uses interventionism as a primary crux, sees the actions of the Soviet and US governments as extensions of civil wars; where ideology is the dividing line between civil forces.  This is chiefly because “the extraordinary brutality of Cold War interventions…can only be explained by Soviet and American identification with the people they sought to defend.”[vi]  Iconic examples mentioned in the text are Vietnam and Afghansitan, but also include conflicts from Africa and Southeast Asia, such as intervention in the Congo in 1960 and the actions taken against Sukarno in Indonesia.  All of these conflicts can be understood individually, but the Cold War as a whole cannot be understood without incorporating these smaller histories of struggle which were defined by the ideological confrontation of East Versus West.
                It would be great to see Westad’s argument extended to a logical conclusion—a linking of Cold War narratives with the histories of colonialism to generate a “Long Cold War” narrative.  For those interested in knowing the harsher, and in many cases more realistic, side of the Cold War….look no further than Westad’s The Global Cold War.


[i] Westad, Odd Arne.  The Global Cold War (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 396
[ii] Ibid
[iii] Ibid
[iv] Ibid, 3
[v] Harvey, David.  Quoted in Westad, 397
[vi] Westad, 5

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