I'm genuinely curious as to what contemporary Communists think--knowing that hindsight is 20/20. Most of the autobiographical and oral history records are very limited in what they express about the event, so I figured I'd post my thoughts after having read all the available material and see if others had comments.
---
The following material is copyrighted.
---
The gains and progress of
American Communism hit a dead halt in September of 1939, when Adolf Hitler and
Joseph Stalin invaded Poland and made it clear to the world the reality of the
Nazi-Soviet Pact. For almost a decade,
the CPUSA and American communists abandoned going solo and many liberal
organizations held a moderate-to-significant communist presence.[i] The Nazi-Soviet Pact, also known as the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, shifted the American communist political movement into
a crisis unparalleled throughout the prewar years. Harvey Klehr noted that, unlike previous
shifts seen from 1928-1929 and again from 1934-1935, the communists in 1939 had
a lot to lose—secured allies in the Democratic coalition, and popularity among
politically-active labor organizations.
After years of denouncing fascism and the rise of Hitler, the communists
found themselves reluctantly supporting peace with Nazi Germany.
In
the autobiographical and oral history record, American communists are uniformly
reluctant to discuss their involvement in and opinion about the Nazi-Soviet
pact, for obvious reasons. Lumpkin, for
example, makes no mention of the pact in her autobiography that covers
involvement with American Communism over a period that spans nearly 75
years. Charney, already frustrated with
elements of CPUSA leadership by 1939, described the signing of the pact as “a
complete shock.” Some of the local
disctrict members of Harlem, shared Charney’s “hot resentment….toward the
wiseacres of the Party leadership.”
Writing thirty years after the event and an ex-CPUSA member, Charney
lamented that the emotional “hangover” continued for decades despite the
subsequent change of policy in June of 1941.
The Nazi invasion of the socialist motherland reversed the Party line
almost overnight, causing cynicism and mistrust within the organizations that
shared communist presence.[ii]
In
practice, the CPUSA leadership relied on the Comintern to help rationalize the
pact. In monthsleading up to the pact, Browder
and the CPUSA leadership spilled much ink over the topic of Roosevelt’s
neutrality. In May, the Party urged
“every mass pressure upon Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act, or
fundamentally modify it to penalize the aggressor and aid the victim of
aggression.”[iii] Between September of 1939 and July of 1941,
American communists spent most of their time rationalizing the agreement. Browder addressed a crowd in Chicago to
celebrate American Communism’s 20th birthday and read sections of
Molotov’s speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, trying to emphasize that
lower ranking members not “rush to judgement.”
Klehr noted that the Party’s publications subsequently poured out a
general explanation for the pact; assuring their members and readers that the Soviet
agreement ensured peace in the same manner as appeasement.[iv] Behind the veil, Party leaders such as
Browder, Foster, and Alexander Bittleman debated over how to maintain alliances
while supporting the Soviet decision.
Bittleman desired to see an increase in support for Stalin’s decision
and emphasize that a Germany-Soviet alliance could result in a war against the
capitalist powers of the world. Foster, reluctant
to support a policy that would mean an immediate break with existing Popular
Front alliances, wanted to maintain the depiction of an agreement for peace
while avoiding denouncement of Western allies.[v]
Charney
purported this Party line, albeit reluctantly.
To him and his Harlem Party associates, the pact was a natural response
to the failure of Britain and France to extend a defensive alliance to the USSR
by 1938. Mixed along with this however,
Charney and his Harlem political associates felt “limp and confused” in the
immediate aftermath of the pact, and rushed to justify it via non-Party sources
such as Frederick Schuman of Williams College and Ambassador Joseph Davies;
both who found ideological explanations for the agreement.[vi]
By
July of 1941, the war for American communists had transformed once again into a
“just war” for the purpose of destroying fascism.
