Reconciling the Absolute
Hegel on
Religion in Society and Mind
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Among the prolific philosophers of
the 19th century, Georg W. Hegel stood out as the century’s grandfather
of modern idealism. His early works, Phenomenology of Spirit and The Science of Logic set forth the
tradition the ultimately became the basis for contemporary philosophy and
historical analysis among various schools of thought. Hegel’s utility of the dialectical triad, a
thesis-antithesis-synthesis system of rational thought progression,
necessitated a historical assessment of society in a European community whose logical
tradition viewed ideas as static and un-changing categorical forms. Though these early works by Hegel are usually
considered his most important, scholars also give particular attention to his
final work, The Philosophy of Religion,
as the culmination of dialectical theory and method. Marx later borrowed heavily from this work as
well as The Philosophy of Right in
order to develop his assessment of the materialist conception of history. It is thus important to consider how Hegel
viewed religion[1]
within society as a means for better understanding how this perception
influenced the subsequent thinkers of the Hegelian tradition; Marx, Engels,
Lenin, Sartre, Dunayevskaya, Marcuse, and Aronson.
This
essay explores the concept of Religion through Hegel’s works in the context of 19th
century European society. Understanding
Hegel’s philosophy as a product of the 19th century German tradition
in flux with more broad changes in European philosophy highlights the evolution
of Hegelian thought into contemporary society.
Broadly speaking, Hegel spoke on religion in both general terms, though
for him Christianity represented the socially dominant and “consummate”
religion. Religion, as a concept, represented
both specific and general manifestations of the absolute; the ultimate truth, the unequivocal answer to everything.[2] Historically, philosophy as a study played a
fundamental role in accessing and representing this absolute in logical terms. Hegel called the specific conceptualization
of the absolute the ‘Spirit’ of a
society. For 19th century
Germany, this Spirit expressed itself within the social institutions of the
State, Civic Society, and the Family; all mediated by the religion of
Christianity. Hegel established and
argued this point adamantly with his magnum opus, Phenomenology of Spirit.[3]
The
logical conclusion of Hegel’s assertion emphasized that by understanding a
society’s religion, one opened a pathway to understanding their relationship to
the absolute. For Hegel, this, above all
others, explained the divisive nature between the “theologia naturalis” and the irreligious philosophy of early 19th
century Europe. Hegel’s lectures from
1824-1832 suggested that the future of religion in society and thought depended
upon the reconciliation between rational theology and religion; a
reconciliation that must be made through dialectical reason, the so-called
“necessity of philosophy in general.”[4] This can further help explain the “return to
Hegel”, as declared by Raya Dunayevskaya and further reiterated by Christopher Arthur,
which deemed dialectical reasoning necessary for contemporary political economy
and philosophy.[5]
Hegel
explained his endeavor to discuss the “philosophy of Religion in general” as
part of a larger epistemological discussion that occurred within the German
intellectual community during the 1820s.
The discussion revolved around the role of the theologia naturalis, or the “natural philosophy of the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries” where “everything that could be known of
God [was done] by reason alone.”[6] Hegel’s concern rested on the attempt of 18th
and 19th century philosophers’ attempt to draw a clear distinction
between reason and natural theology. Cognition,
and its practical application of les
sciences exactes[7]
appeared to contrast the theologia
naturalis and displace it while relegating traditional theology to its own
space in intellectual thought. Coming
forward as a staunch critic of Aristotelian formal logic, Hegel asserted that
this missed the forest for the trees:
“There was a time when all science was a science of
God. It is the distinction of our age,
by contrast, to know each and every thing, indeed to know an infinite mass of
objects, but only of God to know nothing.
With respect to its content, we must regard such a point of view as the
last step in the degradation of humanity.
Yet at the same time, humanity is all the more arrogant in that it has
proved this degradation to be its supreme achievement, its true definition, and
there is only this formal aspect that still has any interest.”[8]
At the heart of Hegel’s assessment of
the ongoing debate was a ruthless criticism of 19th century attempts
to dislodge God from rational thought by emphasizing the finite and material
world through empiricism. To reiterate his
staunch criticism, Hegel upheld that such a view was “directly opposed to the
whole nature of the Christian religion,” thereby emphasizing the contrasting
currents of European intellectual thought and the social practice of Europe’s
dominant religion. Emphasizing this
dialectical assessment of early 19th century idealism created the
foundation for subsequent materialist criticism by Proudhon and Marx in the
late 1830s.
It
can be difficult to understand Hegel’s use of phrases such as absolute and Spirit without fully understanding the context under which he
defined them. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel described
“Spirit” in ethical, cultural, and moral language. As Hegelian philosopher Buterin rephrased it,
the “general theme” of Spirit “is the divine in art, religion, and philosophy.”[9] At the time of Phenomenology’s publication, Hegel described the “position of the
Spirit” as “the level which the self-conscious mind at present occupies.”[10] In other words, an individual’s present
perception of the world at any given moment was the “position,” or the
perspective, of their “finite Spirit.”
Philosophy, Hegel contended, held the role of “rescu[ing] mankind from
being sunken in what is sensuous, vulgar, and of fleeting importance, and to
raise men’s eyes to the stars.”[11]
Building on this mission, the
ultimate goal for philosophy and society was the realization of absolute truth. Hegel described this process as society
becoming self-conscious of itself on a level beyond the self-consciousness of
the individual. Likewise, Hegel’s use of
the term God refers to the presence
of Spirit within a community, as opposed to God “as such or as object.” Thus, Spirit holds a dual nature; on the one hand,
the Spirit of an individual is personal, finite, and subjective, whereas the
Spirit of God is “not finite Spirit but absolute Spirit.”[12] In this way, Hegel represents the idea of
God—the absolute idea—as “the result of philosophy” working itself out through
reason. Hegelian historian Terry
Pinkard, asserted that Hegel’s “God-talk” had its influences in European
Christiantom, but its real purpose is the “conception of freedom” which “has as
its primary support non-Christian sources such as Aristotle and Spinoza.”[13] This implies that orienting Hegel’s
assessment of God through the lens of Christianity purposefully overcomplicates
the message. Hence, Hegel’s use of
phrases like “God” and “religion” naturally carry non-specific, abstract
attributes that can be subjectively defined in various ways—which Hegel does by
discussing religion in India, China, and Greece.[14] Now that Hegel’s rationality of religion can
be seen as an objective assessment of society, as opposed to a theological
argument, we can proceed to Hegel’s assessment of the two approaches to the “philosophy
of religion.”
In
his 1824 lecture, Hegel addressed empiricism as the contrast to “speculative”
approaches to religion. The difference
between the two approaches reflected the antagonistic nature each had toward
one another. Empirical studies “take
something immediately from the representation and consider what is
characteristic of it,” while speculative studies begin “with what is wholly
concrete, with what belongs to the final stage.”[15] Hegel started with the empirical assessment
of religion since he believed it to be “the representation of Religion that
people nowadays adhere to on the whole.”[16] At the onset, Hegel explained, trying to
assess religion through the empirical approach presented a conundrum: “We know, to be precise, that God does not
offer himself for observation; that he cannot be perceived through the external
experience of the senses.” As such,
empirical assessments of God reveal limited understandings, since “God cannot
be conceived.” Rather, knowledge of God
was a feeling, an emotion, an inward representation. The entire empirical endeavor became
pointless as it merely exposed that we cannot empirically study a feeling, a
“proposition that every child has already learned from his first instruction.”[17]
After
highlighting empiricism’s limitations as a school of thought, the focus of
Hegel’s lectures from 1824-1831 emphasized a concept he previously only implied
through comparisons made in Phenomenology
as well as The Science of Logic; the
idea that philosophy developed two systems of thought antithetical to one
another within world history. The
culprit, Hegel believed, was the insistence made by empiricists to remove God
from philosophy; thereby ending the theologia
naturalis.[18] Left in its place was “rational theology” and
its practical manifestation, le sciences
exactes. Unlike contrasting two
incompatible systems, however, Hegel asserted that religious and scientific
studies approached the same object of philosophy, truth, from two fundamentally
different angles. “To Religion,” Hegel
began, “belongs the absolute content—but without any cognition according to
this concept of it.” In practical
settings, “these two sides confront[ed] each other” and created within the
individual a metaphysical and psychological conflict. While religion filled “the heart and
mind….with divine substantial consciousness and sensation,” it did so “without
consistency in regard to the determinate, this being.”[19] The problem thus is, as one scholar put it,
that “even when religion is taken seriously, it misses the point by restricting
itself to a metaphysics of the understanding.”[20]
Empiricism, however, by displacing
itself within philosophy against religion,
developed “a coherent connectedness of the determinate” and “a familiarity with
the finite and with thought-determinations.”
The progression of “pure thinking” in the name of Enlightenment caused certain
philosophers to “[leave] the doctrinal system in place” and “arrive at their
own divergent views and sought to interpret the word of God in a different
way.”[21]
The result of empirical cognition when compared to philosophy is thus “a system
on its own account but without solid substance, without God.” Enlightenment rationalism “defeated its own
purposes by denying cognition of anything determinate about God.”[22]
This was the specific origin of rational
theology where “exegesis takes over the written word, interprets it, and
processes only to make the understanding of the word effective.”[23]
Presenting a comparison of Protestant reform to the shift in perspective by
Enlightenment ‘rationalists’ served as an effective metaphor; it allowed Hegel
to continue to discuss rational theology as a study of the finite aspects of the absolute while philosophy in general
continued to seek the infinite
aspects. Empiricism, in this perspective,
does not displace philosophy’s quest to understand God merely by becoming an
accepted authority in society; a perspective that Hegel clearly desired to
fight. Instead, empirical thought contrasted itself against religious
thought, like an outsider living in a foreign nation, creating a wedge between
what was once a single philosophical endeavor: the rationalization of truth.
Precisely
why Hegel felt it necessary to explain this perspective in order to emphasize
the role of religion and Spirit within European society as a whole was
contingent to his dialectical methodology and resistance to seeing ‘religion’
and ‘science’ isolated into two Aristotelian categories, while ‘philosophy’
became void of both. Part-and-parcel to
Hegel’s ongoing critique of the Religious debate was his ongoing criticism of
formal logic. In order to understand the
real nature of science, Hegel contended that one must understand the history of
the discussion itself; its dialectical development from a self-conscious notion
to a socially-accepted idea. In other
words, secular cognition must be understood in its relationship to non-secular
cognition, that of philosophy in general and the philosophy of religion in
specific.
Since, Hegel contended, empiricism
emerged from the theologia naturalis,
the secular mind was understood as the result of the non-secular mind. Ignoring this historical conclusion restricted
certain applications of thought to their respective systems: the scientist
became the “rationalist” while the pious person became among the “faithful.” As separated categories, the two appeared as
distant and unconnected. The conclusion
revealed the reason why early 19th century “religious thinking,”
which continued to assert God’s responsibility for the creation of everything,
came off as “cold and lifeless.”[24] Contrasted against science, religion became
“repetitious and burdensome” in a society where religious thinking became
limited to Sundays and Church.[25] Rational theology, by the early 19th
century, came to represent a “kind of theology…that leaves reason aside and
expressly rejects philosophy.”[26]
Hegel,
a philosopher coming from a 19th century Christian society, was
certainly not happy about his own conclusions.
This likely explains his adamancy in perpetuating this perspective
across his lectures from 1824-1831, properly termed the Philosophy of Religion. In
the early lectures of 1824, Hegel spent a lengthy amount of time
differentiating “philosophy” from “the philosophy of religion” and “rational
theology;” all of which were previously united under the theologia naturalis. With
empirical thought increasingly dominating intellectual discussion while
religious thinking relegated itself to certain spheres of society, Hegel argued that people could engage in religious thinking without
seriously believing what they say or without seriously trying to understand
God.[27] The regressive consequence was
“that no meaning for the expression ‘God’ remain[ed] in theology any
more than in philosophy, save only the representation, definition, or
abstraction of the supreme being—a vacuum of abstraction, a vacuum of ‘the
beyond.’”[28]
The following diagram illustrates
Hegel’s dialectic and this division in philosophy:
An example of piety, the true expression
of religion, is an individual who accepts whatever occurs to them as just, be
it good or bad, and does not reflect on any event. They deal with “the structure and arrangement
of natural things in terms of their teleological relations.”[29] There was the religious way of understanding
this; that God activates these events because he created them. There was, however, also the cognitive
method: To view the act and will of God
in terms of “specific activities, natural circumstances…etc.” Piety thus holds a contradictory
existence. On the one hand it begins
with the general thought and purpose of being good, but when this generalized
thought is put against the immediate and finite experience of the individual,
it contains both positive and negative “expediencies.”[30] The individual subsequently feels forced to
choose between one of the modes of thought for each particular occurrence.
Empirical
cognition, contrasted against philosophy as a whole, created a “world of
finitude” by attempting to constitute the universe as a “system.” The negative
consequence of this, and thus the antithetical
nature between rational theology and religion in philosophy, is that by
creating a system for studying the finite world, empiricism found no need for
anything outside that system, including God.
For Hegel, this presented a major transformation in philosophy as a
whole[31]
but one that was at risk for degradation because it revealed only limited
understandings. When we ask, for
example, scientific questions about the grounds and causes for particular
events, Hegel insisted that we inquire into the specific causes and relations,
concepts that empirical reasoning and study explain, but do not continue further. We are not asking for the cause “which
answers for everything” but instead we are demanding causality “exclusively
just for this specific thing.”[32] In other words, individuals restricted their
cognitive thought to be “established in the finite sphere only.” Cognition does not need God, and God does not
need cognition.
Hegel’s task for philosophy was the
reconciliation of these two sides, a “correspondence to the highest demand of
cognition.”[33] Although early 19th century
intellectualism devoted itself to the empirical study of the finite, religion
and philosophy continued to belong to the sphere of the infinite, the
absolute. What philosophy needed was to
find “the infinite in the finite and the finite in the infinite.” In other words, Hegel desired to see a
reconciliation of the heart (passion, feeling, emotion, idealism) with the mind
(rationality, cognitive thought, materialism).[34] Christianity, Hegel contended, needed this
reconciliation moreso than other religions because of the “absolute cleavage”
present in Christian theology. “Pagan
religion,” on the contrary, “contains, from the start, a more serene state of
reconciliation. The Christian religion
is not so serene.”[35] With Christianity, the effect of empirical
thought
“dragged [Christ] down to the level of human affairs, not to the level
of the commonplace but still to that of the human. And so, although Christ remained the focal
point of faith for many people who are religious…it must still seem that the
most weighty doctrines have lost much of their interest; faith in the Trinity
for example, or the miracles in the Old and New Testaments.”[36]
Despite this seemingly staunch
criticism of the nature of religion in European society, Hegel contended that
Christianity represented the “consummate
Religion.” The unique nature of
Christianity was so complex philosophically that Hegel devoted an entire
section of his lecture to it in 1824, 1827, and 1831. Put simply, Hegel believed that
Christianity’s central feature was its consciousness of God as Spirit, whereas
other religions kept God in abstraction; as a deity. Christianity has this “dogmatist”
representation of Spirit through the theology of the Church, but it also
retained a subjective and personal representation through personal “revelation”
where God held an individual relationship with the subject in addition to its
communal relationship with objective society.[37]
Connecting
the dots in a manner where Christianity is both the epitome of rational
cognition and the representation of the division between “rational theology”
and philosophy, Hegel centered the task for the philosophy of religion in
Western Europe. Other religions, he
contended, “contain from their start a more serene state of
reconciliation.” The division between humanity
and nature in Hinduism, for example, was not as overt as within Christianity.[38] However, Christian society was nevertheless
more “rational” in Hegel’s mind because of its perception of God as Spirit in addition to merely an abstract deity.[39] Thus Hegel depicted God as “a process [of]
self-consciousness” within a society, the measurement of which revealed itself
as world history.[40] By the end of his lecture manuscripts, Hegel
continued to reassert this fundamental point; that the observation of history
is the observation of God as a process, the recognition of Spirit emerging from
finitude, becoming conscious of itself as finite Spirit, then transforming into
infinite Spirit as a manifestation of society.
The reconciliation of rational theology and philosophy is the
realization of Spirit, the individual believer recognizing the cognitive
infinite aspects of their existence within the framework of their finite,
empirical reason.
Scholars
described Hegel’s interpretation of this division and reconciliation between
rational theology and philosophy as “the realization that God is the proper
object of science.”[41] For contemporary idealist philosophers like Buterin,
Hegel’s assessment of religion is a “theory of recognition” whereby “freedom”
and its recognition by an individual through reconciliation of philosophy is
the “process of practical self-interpretation according to the norms we
collectively adhere to.”[42] Part of Buterin’s understanding of Hegel
comes from a view that a German philosopher in the 19th century
could not discuss philosophy without the lens of Christianity. The traditional “metaphysical approach to
Hegel,” is thus “not the only viable one.[43] Others, such as George Di Giovanni recognize
Hegel’s appeal to Christianity and his desire to see the world united under a unified
perception of religion:
“As defined by Hegel, the problem that the self must resolve is how to
recognize itself in representations that are necessary to the process of
self-knowledge but which, precisely in order to create the intentional space
required for the recognition, must be universal—therefore abstracted from the
individual.”[44]
Though both scholarly camps
acknowledge Hegel’s assessment of Religion as a “human phenomenon,” they both
see the metaphoric use—and thus the conclusion arrived at—as coming from
different interpretations of religion’s role in society. For Di Giovanni, Hegel logically extended the
epistemological element originated in philosophy to the religious study of
“theology.” For Buterin, Hegel simply
“offered a more conceptually refined and self-critical reworking of Aristotle’s
theory of hylomorphism.”
Still,
there are other scholars who rejected the emphasis of theology in Hegel
entirely, and instead focused on the link to subsequent post-Aristotelian materialist
(hylomorphist) philosophy. For Raya
Dunayevskaya, who made an international call for scholars and Marxists to make
a “return to Hegel” in her 1980s text, The
Philosophy of Revolution, Hegel’s assessment of the Spirit and absolute Idea
cannot be separated from their logical conclusion: the development of historically-materialist
perspectives on society. The negative
side of the story, for Dunayevskaya, lay with the reality that in academia
scholars continuously tried to “cleanse [Hegel] of the ‘subversions’ first by
Marx and then by Lenin.”[45] The real purpose for understanding Hegel is
thus to extend his assessment of society to its “logical conclusion” and arrive
at Marx’s historical methodology:
“Despite the fact that Hegel analyzes the development of consciousness
and self-consciousness as disembodied ‘Spirits’, despite the fact that Freedom
and Reason likewise appear as activities of the mind, despite the fact that
Hegel’s ‘estranged insight’ has only caught ‘the abstract, logical and
speculative expression for the movement of history,’ Marx concluded that the
dialectic reveals ‘transcendence as an objective movement.”
Thus, for Marxists, Hegel’s
assessment of religion as creating an ‘objective movement’, whereby the self can
become conscious of itself by “seeing the finite within the infinite,” created
the foundation for understanding self-liberation in the community.
The
genuine crux of Hegel’s lectures on religion rested on dialectical
methodology. If one does not see the
antithetical components within a movement, such as the antithetical nature
between rational theology and religion by the 19th century, one fails
to realize their relationship to these two concepts and subsequently fails to
understand their own estrangement and alienation. The over-arching principle here being that one
cannot escape the conditions created by their society’s religion.
Hegel’s call for a “reconciliation”
between the two sides is endemic of his conceptualization of a synthesis, which subsequently drives
history forward. For Hegel, this reconciliation
was the future of European society, a synthesis between two idealist camps and
the generation of a new relationship to God, or the absolute Idea. This, like all syntheses in history, would
necessitate social changes and rearrange the Spirit of European society,
thereby altering the setup of the state, civic life, and the family. For 19th century Europe, these
conditions were unique and specific—with the cleavages and unity set forth by Christianity—while
the rest of the world developed its own relationship to God. The general theme, as argued by Buterin, is
the manifestation of freedom in a society, in mind and body, as a byproduct of
the synthesis.
Hegel’s insistence on the necessity
of dialectical reasoning to understand the manifestation of Christianity in
Europe highlighted his revolutionary assessment of history; again demanding
that to understand the dominant mode of thought in a society, one must be
conscious of its dialectical history.
Though this can be interpreted many ways, from Hegel merely advancing
Aristotelian theories about metaphysics, or as creating the foundation for an
entirely new methodology of history, Hegel’s lectures on the Philosophy of
Religion are essential to understanding the development of rational idealism in
the modern era. This stepping stone helps
unearth and explain the massive upsurge in materialist philosophy during the 20th
century into a variety of ideological schools.
This, in Hegel’s words, is the 21st century’s “general need
for philosophy.”
Bibliography
Arthur, Christopher. The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital
(London: Brill, 2002)
Buterin, Damion.
“Hegel, Recognition, and Religion” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 64, No. 4 (2011)
Di Giovanni, George.
“Faith without Religion, Religion without Faith: Kant and Hegel on Religion,” in The Journal of the History of Philosophy,
Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 2003)
Dunayevskaya, Raya. The Philosophy of Revolution. (New York:
Lexington Books, 1989)
Hegel, G.W. Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1985)
-----. Philosophy of
Religion Vol. II (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1985)
-----. Philosophy of
Religion Vol. III (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1986)
-----. Phenomenology of Spirit and Mind (Marxist
Internet Archive, 2014)
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
[1] Though
Hegel focused his attention to Christianity as the consummate religion in his later 1931 Lecture, he discussed ‘Religion’
in abstract. When specificities were
necessary, Hegel referred directly to the religions by their name and origin.
[2]
This is an insisted argument of Phenomenology
of Spirit, mentioned lightly in the Preface.
[3]
Though it is impossible to summarize Phenomenology
of Spirit, the central idea behind the entire work is the conceptualization
of a social Spirit which embodies the
ideals and aspirations of a society in abstraction, while the existing
framework of society (ie…the arrangement of the State, the family, civil life)
represents a finite reflection of the absolute and infinite Spirit.
[4]
Hegel, “Preface to 1827 Lecture Manuscript” in Philosophy of Religion Vol. I (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 104
[5]
Dunayevskaya, Raya. “Why Hegel? Why Now?” in The Philosophy of Revolution (New York: Lexington Books, 1989): 47-95; Arthur,
Christopher. “The Return to Hegel,” in The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital
(London: Brill, 2002): 1-10
[6]
Ibid, p. 83
[7]
For Hegel’s precise source on the general distinction to science and religious
cognition, he cites Jacobi, Cf. “Briefe
uber Spinoza” in Werke, Vol. 4, No.
2: 149-150
[8]
Hegel, “Preface to 1827 Lecture Manuscript,” p. 88
[9] Buterin,
Damion. “Hegel, Recognition, and
Religion” in The Review of Metaphysics,
Vol. 64, No. 4 (2011): 790
[10]
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit and Mind,
Preface #7
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm
[11]
Hegel, “Introduction, 1827 Lecture,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I, p. 119
[12] Ibid
[13]
Pinkhard, Terry. Quoted from Buterin,
790
[14]
Hegel, “The Religion of Magic,” 1824 Lecture & “The Religion of Beauty, or
the Greek Religion,” 1827 Lecture, in Philosophy
of Religion, Vol. II, p. 272 & 642
[15]
Hegel, “The Concept of Religion, 1827 Lecture,” in Philosophy of Religion Vol. I, 257
[16]
Ibid
[17]
Ibid
[18]
Ibid, 258
[19]
Hegel, “1827 Lecture Manuscript,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I, p. 103
[20] Buterin,
791
[21]
Hegel, “Introduction, 1824 Lecture,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I, 122
[22]
Buterin, 791
[23] Hegel,
“Introduction,” 1824 Lecture, in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I, 123
[24]
Ibid, 96
[25]
Ibid
[26]
Ibid, 125
[27]
ie: by removing religion from the state, by separating religious teachings from
scientific ones, etc.
[28]
Hegel (I), 126
[29]
Ibid, 98
[30]
Ibid, 100
[31]
It should be clear that Hegel, unlike the Empiricists, was not comfortable
accepting that Empiricism had fully “left” philosophy.
[32]
Hegel (I), 102
[33]
Ibid, 104
[34]
Ibid 104
[35]
Ibid, 105
[36]
Ibid, 157
[37]
Hegel, “1827 Lecture Manuscript,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. III (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1985), p. 63
[38] Hegel,
“The Religion of Fantasy, Hinduism,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. II, 316-317
[39]
Hegel, “1827 Lecture Manuscript,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. I, 105
[40]
Hegel, “1827 Lecture Manuscript,” in Philosophy
of Religion Vol. III, 62
[41] Buterin,
793
[42]
Ibid, 789
[43]
Ibid
[44]
Di Giovanni, George. “Faith without
Religion, Religion without Faith: Kant
and Hegel on Religion,” in The Journal of
the History of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 3 (July, 2003): 365
Well done!
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